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Abstract 
In the theoretical macroeconomics literature, fiscal policy is almost uniformly taken to mean 
taxing and spending by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits the potential aggregate demand 
externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods markets.  Whilst shown to 
raise aggregate output and employment, these policies crowd-out private consumption and hence 
typically reduce welfare. In this paper we consider the use of ‘tax-and-subsidise’ instead of ‘tax-
and-spend’ policies on account of their widespread use by governments, even in the recent 
recession, to stimulate economic activity. Within a static general equilibrium macro-model with 
imperfectly competitive good markets we examine the effect of wage and output subsidies and 
show that, for a small open economy, positive tax and subsidy rates exist which maximise 
welfare, rendering no intervention as a suboptimal state. We also show that, within a two-country 
setting, a Nash non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists, 
and that cooperation between trading partners in setting these rates is more expansionary and 
leads to an improvement upon the non-cooperative solution. 
 
 
Keywords:  fiscal policy, international trade, monopolistic competition, Nash 
equilibrium, policy coordination, welfare 
 
JEL classification: E6, F1, H2 
Corresponding Author:  Hassan Molana, Economic Studies, University of Dundee, Dundee DD1 4HN, UK.  
 Tel: +44(0)1382 384375. E-Mail: h.h.molana@dundee.ac.uk  
 
 1 
 
 
1.   Introduction  
The use of imperfectly competitive market structures in macroeconomic models which are 
designed to study policy effectiveness is nowadays a routine practice. In the goods market, this is 
usually done by assuming a monopolistic competition structure à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
model of horizontal product differentiation. A well-known feature of this type of good markets is 
that they give rise to an inefficient equilibrium resulting from the suboptimality of the number of 
product varieties. Since in such a situation exogenous interventions can be designed to reduce 
this inefficiency—either by stimulating new entry and raising the number of varieties or by 
raising the output level of incumbents—the underlying framework has been used intensively to 
study the role of fiscal policy.  
 In the macroeconomics literature, fiscal policy is almost uniformly taken to mean taxing 
and spending by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits the potential for aggregate demand 
externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods market; specifically, an 
exogenous rise in government expenditure, spent on the differentiated good, is shown to raise 
aggregate output and employment. There are, however, two serious caveats associated with this 
type of exercise. First, in almost all cases the welfare effect of such a fiscal expansion, measured 
by the change in consumers’ utility, happens to be negative. This is because private consumption 
is always crowded out by the rise in public expenditure—to the extent that even allowing private 
and public expenditure complementarity does not usually prevent the welfare loss—and 
consumers’ leisure is reduced as a result of the change in the real wage and the shift in the 
aggregate supply. In this respect, therefore, the conventional fiscal expansion does not seem to 
lend itself to a clear optimal or ‘efficient’ policy agenda in this context since the resulting 
positive fiscal multiplier goes hand in hand with a welfare loss.1 The second caveat stems from 
the choice of fiscal policy: given that the underlying inefficiency is entirely due to the specific 
market structure, an aggregate demand expansion cannot be the best way to tackle the resulting 
suboptimality; as Dixit and Stiglitz originally pointed out, the use of a subsidy which directly 
targets firms cost and profitability would be a better way to combat the problem.  
 In this paper we propose the use of ‘tax-and-subsidise’ instead of ‘tax-and-spend’ and 
show that it is possible to design an optimal policy which raises the level of economic activity 
                                                          
1  Reinhorn (1998) shows that, in this context, the optimal policy is zero government expenditure. See Costa and 
Dixon (2009) for a recent survey. There is also an additional shortcoming due to using an identical CES aggregation 
for the private and public bundles when the latter too consists of expenditure on the differentiated good (as 
otherwise the analysis becomes intractable) but this simplifying assumption totally eliminates the distinction 
between the public and private goods which would only be acceptable when output is homogenous. Moreover, this 
type of government expenditure will prove to be problematic when considering an open economy under free trade 
since a typical CES bundle will consist of both domestic and foreign varieties—but it is not always feasible (or 
plausible) to spend tax revenue on foreign produced varieties. 
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(output and employment) while maximising consumers’ welfare. The use of subsidy in the 
presence of horizontal product differentiation is not entirely new in the literature and various 
studies have examined its role as an effective policy instrument. However, the focus in this 
literature is almost entirely on how the subsidy policy affects the particular sector or industry 
and/or interacts with the volume of trade.2 The use of a tax-and-subsidise policy has not been 
explored within the context of conventional general equilibrium macroeconomic models that 
examine the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Doing so, and within an open economy setting, is of 
relevance given the widespread use of tax-and-subsidise policies in most economies as a means 
to sustain employment—and their use has recently intensified as policy authorities in different 
countries have been combating the recent recession: e.g., direct job subsidies, wage subsidies or 
reductions in payroll taxes have been used in a number of countries to stimulate labour demand.3  
 In order to examine the effectiveness of tax-and-subsidise policy, we develop a standard 
static general equilibrium model à la Startz (1989) and extend it to allow for the role of 
international trade both within small-open-economy and a two-country setting.4 Specifically, we 
examine the effect of a wage subsidy as well as of a subsidy given to the produces for each unit 
of output produced and find in both cases that optimal positive tax and subsidy rates exist that 
maximise welfare, rendering no interaction as a suboptimal state. One of the key messages of 
this finding is that distortionary fiscal policies (which affect relative prices) can work well when 
the market structure entails a distorted equilibrium. For the two-country setting we show that a 
Nash non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists which 
can be improved upon by cooperation. This is in line with the received wisdom that calls for 
fiscal policy coordination and goes against the (somewhat counterintuitive) findings that show 
non-cooperative fiscal policies tend to be more expansionary relative to the corresponding 
cooperative outcome outcomes—e.g., Chari and Kehoe (1990).   
                                                          
2  Some of the papers in Brakman and Heijdra (Eds, 2004) discuss the role of subsidy but none in the same 
context as discussed here. Lin (1996) shows how export subsidy can counteract consumption distortions under 
monopolistic competition and improve welfare.    
3  On average, this type of programmes amount to about 25% of total expenditures on active labour market 
policies in OECD countries (OECD, 2003). The use of such subsidies was endorsed as a means to accelerate jobs 
recovery by the recent ILO-IMF (2010) Conference on “The Challenges of Growth, Employment and Social 
Cohesion”. Many countries (including e.g. Germany, France, Japan, Finland, Sweden, Ireland) have increased 
reliance on these programmes during the recent recession.  
4  The majority of macroeconomic models on the subject are cast in closed economy framework. It is however 
recognised that openness to trade can have a substantial (negative) impact on the effectiveness of fiscal policy; for 
instance, Cooper (1985) argues that the expansionary domestic effects of fiscal policy is reduced due to the demand 
leakage. The open economy models which addressed fiscal policy usually focussed on tax policy coordination and 
did not involve goods market imperfections—see, amongst others, e.g., Turnovsky (1988), van der Ploeg (1987, 
1988) and Devereux (1991).  
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 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the model in a small-
open-economy setting and analyses the role of wage subsidy. Starting with no subsidy, we find 
that introducing a small subsidy—financed by taxing consumers’ income—increases both 
welfare and the level of economic activity by raising entry, and go on to show that an optimal 
policy outcome with positive tax and subsidy rates exists. In Section 3, we modify the model to 
show that (i) using a subsidy per unit of output does not change the result qualitatively although 
in this case the gain is achieved by raising each firm’s level of output; and (ii) the optimality 
result holds for the two-country case and cooperation in setting the optimal level of subsidy 
improves upon the non-cooperative outcome. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2.   The small-open-economy model 
The economy consists of two industries, one imperfectly competitive and one perfectly 
competitive, respectively producing a horizontally differentiated and a homogeneous 
commodity. Both products are freely traded with the rest of the world. Labour, the only factor of 
production, is perfectly mobile between the two industries but is immobile internationally.  
 
2.1. The demand side 
On the demand side, the utility function for the aggregate representative consumer is defined 
over the two consumption goods and leisure time, whose quantities are respectively denoted by 
D, A and A . To obtain closed-form solutions, we adopt the commonly used utility function  
 
1 1
1 , 0 1, 0, 0(1 ) 1
A DU
μ μ γ
μ μ
φ μ γ φμ μ γ
− −
−= + < < > >− −
A . (1) 
 Denoting labour supply, the wage rate and the price of the differentiated good 
respectively by L, w and P and using the homogenous good as the numeraire (hence normalising 
its price to unity), the time and budget constraints facing the consumer are 
 1L + =A   (2) 
and 
 ( )1A PD wLτ+ = − ,  (3) 
where τ is the income tax rate. Maximising (1) subject to (2)-(3) yields  
 ( )
1/
1
1
w
L
P
γ
μ
τ
φ
−−⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, (4) 
 ( ) ( )1 1A wLμ τ= − − ,  (5) 
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P
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 D is a CES bundle of domestically produced and imported varieties whose quantities are 
denoted by y and ,
f
x  respectively. Let ( ),ip N  and ( ),fi fp N  represent the price and mass of 
varieties of the differentiated good produced domestically and abroad respectively. In the 
absence of transport costs, the CES price and quantity indices then are  
 ( )
1
1
( 1) /(1 ) 1 1
0 0
f
f
NN
f i i fP N N p di p di
σλ σ σ σ
−− − − −⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ,  (7) 
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1
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f
f
NN
f i i fD N N y di x di
σλ σ σ σ
−− − − − −⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ,  (8) 
where the constant parameter λ∈[0,1] captures the extent to which the CES bundle explicitly 
incorporates the so-called “love of variety”; λ=0 and λ=1 correspond to the two extreme cases of 
“no love” and of “maximum love” respectively—see Benassy (1996) and Molana and Montagna 
(2000) for details. Together with (6), the above imply the variety-level demand functions  
 ( ) ( )1 1 ii f wL py N N P P
σλ μ τ −− − ⎛ ⎞= + ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,  [0, ]i N∈ ,  (9) 
 ( ) ( )1 1 f
f
i
i f
pwL
x N N
P P
σ
λ μ τ −− ⎛ ⎞−= + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, [0, ]f fi N∈ . (10) 
 By virtue of the small-open-economy setting, we should treat the number of foreign 
varieties available for consumption and their prices, fN  and fip , as being exogenous and not 
affected by any domestic developments. By the same argument, we also assume the foreign 
expenditure on domestically produced varieties, fE , to be exogenous. Thus, further assuming 
that foreign and domestic consumers have identical tastes (and hence the same elasticity of 
substitution between varieties), the foreign demand facing the domestic firm producing variety i 
can be modelled as   
 i f ix E p
σ−= ,  [0, ]i N∈ , (11) 
where ix  is the quantity of variety i demanded by the ‘rest-of-the-world’.  
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2.2. The supply side with wage subsidy 
In the differentiated good sector, firms use labour as the only input to produce one variety of the 
good according to an increasing returns to scale technology that is homogenous across firms. 
Each domestic variety of the differentiated good is produced by one domestic firm only. A 
typical firm i’s labour demand is   
 , [0, ]i il z i Nα β= + ∈ ,  (12) 
where z is the total production (supply) of variety i, and α  and β  are the fixed and marginal 
labour requirements respectively. The profit of firm i therefore is   
 ( ) , [0, ]i i i ip z w s l i Nπ = − − ∈ ,  (13) 
where w is the wage rate and s<w is the subsidy that the firm receives from the government for 
each unit of labour it employs.  The firm chooses its price to maximise profit ignoring the effect 
of its action on the industry price index. This yields the optimal price rule as a mark-up on 
marginal cost, 
 ( ) . [0, ]
1i
w s
p i N
σβ
σ
−= ∈− .  (14) 
Imposing the zero-profit condition that results from free-entry and using (14) we obtain  
 ( )1 , [0, ]iz i Nα σβ
−= ∈ ,  (15) 
which is the familiar constant optimal firm scale. Thus the subsidy is partly passed on to the 
consumer by lowering the price of the good and it does not affect the firm’s optimal scale of 
operation.  
 The homogenous good is produced under perfectly competitive conditions using a 
constant returns technology with unit labour requirement,  
 sAL A= ,  (16) 
where AL  is the labour demand of this sector and the superscript s denotes supply. The constant 
returns to scale technology, the zero-profit condition in the homogenous good sector and free 
mobility of labour across the two domestic sectors imply the equality between the wage rate and 
the price of the homogeneous good, i.e. 1w = . 
2.3. The equilibrium 
The market equilibrium condition for a variety i of the differentiated good is  
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 i i iy x z+ = .  (18) 
The labour market equilibrium requires  
 A iL Nl L+ = .  (19) 
The government budget constraint which equates the subsidy bill to the tax revenue is  
 isNl Lτ= .  (20) 
Given the assumed symmetry between firms, the price index of the differentiated good in (7) can 
be re-written as ( ) ( ) 1( 1) /(1 ) 1 1 1ff i f iP N N Np N pλ σ σ σ σ− − − − −= + + . Finally, the general equilibrium 
requires the trade balance condition, ( ) ( ) 0f fs f i i i iA A N p x Np x− + − = , which can be shown to 
hold when markets clear.  
   
2.4. The optimal policy 
Of the two policy instruments, the subsidy rate s and the tax rate τ, the government can use one 
and let the other adjust to clear the resulting budget deficit or surplus. Suppose that, starting from 
an initial equilibrium position where 0s τ= = , the government stimulates the economy by 
raising s. The immediate impact of this is to (i) raise N by encouraging entry, and (ii) reduce ip  
as the subsidy reduces the unit labour cost. These imply a reduction in P and an increase in the 
real wage that stimulates labour supply (which is absorbed by the new firms, whose entry shifts 
up the labour demand); other things equal, the resulting increase in income will raise aggregate 
demand for goods. However, in order to compensate the fiscal deficit caused by the subsidy, the 
tax rate will need to be allowed to rise until the resulting tax revenue pays for the deficit. It can 
be shown that this only partially crowds out the initial impact of the subsidy and the net effect is 
an increase in the level of economic activity.5  
 The possibility of optimal policy in the context of the above model arises if the 
government can choose one of its policy instruments to maximise an adequately defined welfare 
function for the economy, letting the other policy variable adjust to satisfy its budget constraint.  
Given that profits are wiped out by entry, we proxy the welfare function by the indirect utility 
function,  
                                                          
5  This result holds as long as the fall in P dominates the rise in τ  so that the net real wage and hence labour 
supply rises; see equation (4) above recalling that w =1.  
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 ( ) ( )11 1
1
L L
U
P
γ
μ
τ φ
γ
−− −= + − , (1′) 
which is obtained by substituting (2), (5) and (6) in (1) and imposing w=1.6  
 Suppose that the government chooses the tax rate τ to maximise welfare, letting the 
subsidy rate s be determined freely. To derive the optimal τ in this context, we first solve the 
model treating τ as exogenous (and s as endogenous) and obtain the solution for all the 
endogenous variables in terms of the parameters and exogenous variables—namely α, β, γ, λ, φ, 
μ, σ, 
fi
p , fE , fN  and τ. This solution portrays an ad hoc equilibrium which can be shown to be 
unique and stable for all feasible value of the parameters and exogenous variables. To find the 
optimal value of τ we first substitute in (1′) for L and P their ad hoc equilibrium solution and 
then maximise the resulting function with respect to τ. Because the algebraic expressions are 
analytically intractable, we illustrate the existence of an optimal tax rate as follows. Imposing 
w=1 on equation (4) we can totally differentiate it to obtain  
 ( ) ,11 PdLsign signd τ
μ τ ετ τ
−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ = − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, (21) 
where ,P
dP
P dτ
τε τ=  is negative as long as the tax revenue is used to subsidise firms⎯which  
raises the number of domestically produced varieties and reduces their price. Given that ,P τε  is 
finite, at a very small level of τ (sufficiently close to zero) the second term in parentheses on the 
right-hand-side dominates, making / 0dL dτ > . However, as τ rises this term becomes smaller 
resulting eventually in / 0dL dτ <  and making L a concave function of τ. Therefore, positive 
levels of tax and subsidy exist at which the economy reaches the maximum level of economic 
activity. In Figure 1, we use a numerical calibration of the model7 to plot what we refer to as the 
ad hoc equilibrium values of L and the corresponding U against τ in order to illustrate the above 
concavity which enables exercising optimal taxation policy.  
                                                          
6  It is worth noting that for all γ >0, welfare is monotonically increasing in L. To see this, use (4) to eliminate 
(1 ) / Pμτ−  from (1′), obtaining ( ) ( )( )11 1 1U L L γφ γ γ− −= − − −  which implies ( ) (1 )/ 1 0dU dL L L γφγ − += − > . Hence, given that 
as the only factor of production L represents the level of economic activity, this result simply shows that welfare is a 
monotonically increasing function of the level of economic activity.   
7  In all calibrations, the bench solution is based on the following values: α=1/120, β = 0.08, γ =2/3, λ=1, φ= 4.64, 
μ=2/3, σ=5, 
fi
p =0.1, fE = .0002, fN =8 and τ=0. Note that the small size of fE  reflects its relative magnitude and 
0<γ <1 is imposed to ensure that the leisure effect does not dominate in the utility function when L is close to unity 
(although relaxation of this does not affect the results). Sensitivity analyses show that the numerical solution is 
robust. 
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 In the model outlined above welfare is maximised since the wage effect in the utility 
function dominates, making the indirect utility an increasing function of L (see the explanation in 
footnote 6). However, we wish to emphasise that an optimal tax rate in this context also exists 
even if we assume an exogenous labour supply and eliminate leisure from the utility function. It 
is straightforward to show that while in such a model the level of economic activity (which is 
fixed by the exogenous labour supply) is no longer affected by the tax-and-subsidise policy, it is 
still possible to find an optimal level of tax which reallocates economic activity between the two 
sectors such that the indirect utility is maximised. Clearly, when the level of economic activity is 
fixed exogenously by inelastically supplied factors of production which are fully employed, the 
tax-and-subsidise policy only corrects the consumption distortion8; in the model outlined in this 
paper, the policy does both, enabling the economy to reach its optimal level of aggregate 
economic activity and the best allocation of this activity across the two sectors. 
 The above model is also sufficiently general to examine how welfare is affected by 
consumers’ love-of-variety, availability of imported varieties and the foreign demand for 
domestic varieties⎯captured by λ, Nf and Ef respectively. Figures 2 to 4 show these effects. In 
particular:  
(i)  A fall in λ reduces welfare via the love-of-variety effect and also tightens the channel 
through which the variety effect acts on the price index; hence a reduction in love-of-
variety reduces the expansionary effect of the policy. Some studies in the 
macroeconomics literature have chosen to completely switch off the love-of-variety 
effect on the grounds that the CES aggregator should be such that in a symmetric 
equilibrium (with identical firms) there should be no distinction between the aggregate 
price level and the price of a variety. For instance, Startz (1989) shows that the effect of 
an expansionary fiscal policy is crowded out entirely when it is financed by lump-sum 
taxes and λ=0 is imposed. While our finding that the effectiveness of the policy is 
increasing in λ is qualitatively consistent, in our framework the policy is still 
expansionary and welfare improving even when λ=0.  
(ii)  A reduction in Nf lowers welfare directly via the variety effect as well as diminishing the 
effectiveness of the policy due to a reallocation of economic activity across the two 
sectors which is enhanced by international trade.  
                                                          
8  In these type of economies, the extent of product diversity which prevails in free entry market equilibrium is 
sub-optimal and consumers are forced to consume too much of the ‘other good’—i.e., the homogenous good used as 
numeraire. Hence any policy intervention that corrects this type of distortion can be welfare improving—see Spence 
(1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Matsuyama (1995) for various explanations. 
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(iii) Qualitatively, the welfare effect of a fall in Ef is the same as that of Nf. However, the 
channel of impact differs in the two cases, as Ef contributes to aggregate demand and 
hence to the level of economic activity directly. As a result, while the tax rate, and the 
implied subsidy rate, at which welfare is maximised is lower when Nf falls, these rates are 
both higher when Ef  is reduced. In the context of the model sketched above, the fall in Ef 
can be interpreted as a negative exogenous shock (e.g. due to a contraction in the rest of 
the world), with the results pointing to the optimality of raising the level of stimulus to 
tackle an exogenous fall in demand.  
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3.   Extensions 
3.1. The nature of the subsidy 
In the above analysis, we have examined the impact of a wage subsidy. It is interesting to 
compare how the results change if the subsidy was given to the firm for each unit of the good 
produced rather than for each unit of labour used. The modification involves only equations 
(13)-(15) and (20) which are rewritten below to incorporate a per-unit subsidy:  
 ( ) , [0, ]i i i is p z wl i Nπ = + − ∈ ,  (13′) 
 ( ) , [0, ]
1i
s
p i N
σ β
σ
−= ∈− ,  (14′) 
 ( )1 , [0, ]iz i Ns
α σ
β
−= ∈− , (15′) 
 isNz Lτ= .  (20′) 
 It is worth noting that in this set up a per-unit subsidy affects both price and output scale 
of the firm since the firm experiences a fall in marginal cost—whereas a wage subsidy could be 
interpreted as a reduction in the firm’s average cost (due to the fact that labour is used as both 
fixed and variable input). Compared to the previous case, the firm now charges a relatively lower 
price and produces a higher quantity but its revenue remains unchanged—i.e., i ip z ασ= . Recall 
that in the previous case subsidy reduced the firm’s revenue since ( )1i ip z sαβσ= − ; the 
respective ratio of price, quantity and revenue to those in the previous case are ( ) ( )/ 1 ,s sβ β− −  
( )/ ,sβ β −  and   ( )1/ 1 .s−  Hence, these two types of subsidy have different effects on the 
composition of the industry – with the per-unit subsidy resulting in larger and hence more 
efficient firms.  It is in this sense that a per-unit subsidy can be an interesting alternative policy. 
However, the effect of this policy on welfare and employment turns out to be qualitatively 
identical to the wage subsidy as illustrated in Figures 1 to 4.    
 The fact that both types of subsidies yield qualitatively similar results leads to an 
important policy strategy in circumstances where international policy institutions/rules such as 
WTO/GATT advocate against ‘distorting’ traded goods prices.  The unit revenue subsidy 
outlined here is a good example of one such distortion. But, in principle, subsidising 
employment is very much seen in the context of national welfare programmes when 
governments need to take steps to secure employment levels when economic activity falls below 
its optimal level.  It is worthwhile to conclude the discussion of small open model implications 
by noting that the results obtained above undermine the conclusion by Flam and Helpman (1987) 
 11 
 
 
who establish that a small economy may be harmed by subsidising its exports because the 
subsidy cost exceeds the benefit it generates by counteracting consumption distortion; we find 
exactly the opposite result.  
 
 
3.2.  Relaxing the small country assumption  
From a policy point of view, it is worthwhile casting the model in a standard two-country setting 
in which countries trade freely in final goods and are equally significant players in the integrated 
goods markets. Using a similar setting, Lin (1996) addresses the role of export subsidy 
coordination and shows that it can improve welfare at both a national and a global level. Lin’s 
focus is on trade policy and the role of bilateral export subsidies in counteracting consumption 
deficiencies when goods are horizontally differentiated, and does not consider the effect of this 
policy on the level of economic activity. Within a ‘New Keynesian’ macroeconomic model, our 
focus is instead on fiscal policy and we are primarily interested in the impact of tax-and-
subsidies policy when the authorities can coordinate their action.  In the existing literature, the 
question of policy coordination has been addressed in similar contexts but with different market 
structure and trade pattern. As mentioned above, these studies—e.g., Chari and Kehoe (1990) or 
Turnovsky (1988)—usually find a somewhat counterintuitive result that cooperation is less 
expansionary that the non-cooperative outcome. This is explained by the so-called ‘beggar thy 
neighbour’ effect where in the non-cooperative solution the fiscal expansion which raises 
demand for domestically produced goods causes a demand switch from foreign to domestic 
goods, resulting in an improvement in the terms of trade and the real income of the country 
which expands; this phenomenon is absent in a cooperative setting which results in a smaller 
expansion. Recently, Andersen (2007) has addressed this point showing that once the market 
structure is modified to allow for a more flexible trade pattern, which he implements using the 
horizontal product differentiation structure, the outcome is reversed and the cooperative solution 
entails a larger fiscal expansion.9  In what follows we show the same result to hold for tax-and-
subsidise policy.  
 To analyse the role of policy coordination, let us assume the world to consist of two 
economies identical to that described above, which freely trade both final goods (but rule out 
cross-border labour mobility as before). The necessary modifications of the equations are 
explained in the Appendix. Consider first the situation where each country pursues its optimal 
policy independently, i.e. the Nash non-cooperative outcome. Referring to the countries as home 
                                                          
9  Andersen defines fiscal expenditure as ‘public sector wage bill’⎯paid to employees who produce a public 
good⎯ so as to avoid the problem of spending tax revenue on foreign good (see footnote 1 for details).  
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and foreign and denoting them by the subscripts h and f respectively, let ( ), 0h h fRF s s =  be the 
locus, in ( ),f hs s  space, of the optimal level of hs  for each level of fs − i.e., hRF  is the home 
government’s reaction function. Analytically, this is derived as follows. Treating hs  and fs  as 
exogenous (policy tools), we solve the model for the free entry symmetric ‘ad hoc’ equilibrium 
where hτ  and fτ  are now allowed to adjust to clear the respective government budget constraint. 
We then find the welfare function for the home country by substituting this solution in the utility 
function. hRF  is the derivative of this utility function with respect to hs  (for each fs  that 
satisfies the ‘ad hoc’ equilibrium). In other words, analytically, 0hRF =  is the first-order-
condition for maximising the home country’s indirect utility function subject to its own 
constraints and equilibrium conditions, assuming that the foreign government does not alter fs .  
 Clearly, a ‘well-behaved’ reaction function exists if such an optimisation has a solution. 
If so, the slope of hRF  in the ( ),f hs s  space informs the way the two countries’ policies affect 
each other: a positive (negative) slope indicates strategic complementarity (substitutability). 
Given the results obtained in the previous section, one would expect a priori to find a policy 
externality and hence strategic complementarity. Again, due to algebraic complexity of the 
expressions, we use numerical solutions based on the initial calibration (see footnote 7) to 
illustrate ( ), 0h h fRF s s = . This is shown in Figure 5. As expected, the model gives rise to 
strategic complementarity since hRF  is positively sloped.  Also, the fact that hRF  is flatter than 
the 45o line establishes the existence of a stable symmetric equilibrium at the intersection 
between the two lines (which corresponds to the symmetric Nash non-cooperative solution). This 
result shows that in a two-country setting too a policy intervention is welfare improving even if 
each country chooses to act independently.  
 To see whether cooperation leads to a bigger intervention (a larger subsidy) and improves 
upon the non-cooperative outcome, we evaluate the home country’s utility function extending 
the symmetry to policy and imposing f hs s= . Figure 6 plots this utility function and shows that 
the cooperative policy is welfare improving and leads to a larger subsidy rate; by opting for the 
cooperative solution both countries benefit from higher levels of welfare.10 This result is 
consistent with the findings in both Andersen (2007) and Lin (1996) and lends support to 
                                                          
10  Note that since the non-cooperative solution is fully symmetric, the value of the utility function at the non-
cooperative solution will be identical to that in Figure 6 at the subsidy rate of around 0.03 which is implied in 
Figure 5. It is worth noting that in this model the cooperative policy will also raise the level economic activity in 
both countries. 
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arguments in favour of formulating cooperative fiscal intervention when—as, for instance, 
emphasised by the IMF (2002)—the bigger share of trade between industrialised countries 
involves those commodities which are highly substitutable for domestically produced goods.    
 
 
 
 
4.   Conclusions 
The effectiveness of fiscal policies is sensitive to the structure of goods markets. If the aim of a 
fiscal intervention is to raise welfare, then policies other than tax-and-spend—whether it is a 
‘benevolent government’ directly spending on privately produced goods to raise aggregate 
demand, or the tax revenue is used to generate public sector employment to produce some public 
good or service—should also be considered. This point becomes even more pertinent in the 
context of an open economy with free trade since, by definition, a fiscal expansion ought to be 
targeted to stimulate domestic production only. In a small-open-economy setting with free trade 
in horizontally differentiated goods, this would require defining an ad hoc CES aggregation for 
the public good over domestic varieties only. But in a two-country setting where fiscal policies 
are interdependent this is not plausible as it presupposes a ‘home bias’ which is an obstacle to 
cooperation.  
 In this paper we argue that tax-and-subsidise policies act as optimal fiscal stimuli when 
the market structure is monopolistically competitive. Subsidising firms’ employment is after all a 
practical policy that has been adopted by various governments.11 We show, in a stylised 
                                                          
11  For a recent discussion see OECD (2009) on German Kurzarbeitergeld employment subsidy scheme. The Irish 
government also has introduced a temporary employment subsidy scheme while Japan has augmented her 
Employment Adjustment Subsidy Programme by multiple stimulus packages.  
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macroeconomic model, that such a policy can be employed optimally and that it raises the level 
of economic activity and improves welfare. We also examine the consequences of policy 
coordination within a two-country setting when the authorities adopt a tax-and-subsidise policy 
and show that, compared to the non-cooperative outcome, cooperation improves welfare. The 
relevance of this result is stressed in a situation where product markets are becoming integrated 
internationally and the significant volume of trade involves imported products that are close 
(albeit imperfect) substitutes to those produced domestically.  
 It is worth noting that a tax-and-subsidise intervention may, at least on the surface, 
appear to be closer in nature to an industrial policy targeted to industries or even firms within an 
industry. In this respect, therefore, one may argue that this type of policy ought to be considered 
in parallel with (and not as an alternative to) conventional aggregate demand policies. This paper 
clearly shows that these policies can be effective as a means of stimulating domestic aggregate 
demand directly if subsidy is paid to firms to create new or to sustain existing employment as 
practised recently by governments in tackling the recession⎯for further details see ILO-IMF 
(2010) and OECD (2009).  
 Finally, in this paper we have endogenised the level of economic activity by assuming 
that labour supply is endogenous. Expansionary fiscal policy is typically concerned with 
interventions aimed at reducing the level of unemployed resources. Whilst our results can 
qualitatively shed light on the effectiveness of policy in the presence of underemployment, 
allowing for involuntary unemployment and labour market imperfections is certainly an 
interesting direction for future research.12  
 
 
 
Appendix: The two-country model  
To extend the small-open-economy model to a two-country one, we distinguish between the 
variables of the two countries by subscripts h and f referring to ‘home’ and ‘foreign’ 
respectively. The equations of the model will be as follows:  
(i) equations (1) to (6) should now be for both countries;  
(ii) equation (7) is common to both countries since P will be the same;  
(iii) the equivalent of equations (9) and (10) should be added for the foreign country, namely  
                                                          
12  The results obtained in this paper are qualitatively consistent with those of Molana and Montagna (2006) who 
examined the effects of optimal unemployment benefits in a two country settings in the presence of unionised 
labour markets.  
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(iv) equation (11) is dropped since it is replaced by (10′); 
(v) equations (12) to (20) should now be for both countries; (v) the trade balance equations will 
now be 
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which, again, can be shown to correspond to the market equilibrium condition for the 
homogenous good and should hold by Walras law. 
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